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TEXAS, ABORTION, AND STATE ACTION
Alexander J. Lindvall*
ABSTRACT
The Texas Legislature recently passed what the Supreme Court describes as
an “unprecedented” statutory scheme. Texas’s new law allows private,
everyday citizens to sue anyone who assists a woman in obtaining an abortion
after her sixth week of pregnancy. It’s clear that Texas chose this unusual
enforcement mechanism to try to circumvent the Constitution’s “state action”
requirement. Before a plaintiff can challenge a policy or action on constitutional
grounds, they must show that the government somehow had a hand in causing
their harm. But this Texas law strips the government of its enforcement power
and instead gives it to everyday citizens, thereby allowing the law’s defenders
to argue that the law does not trigger constitutional protections.
This short article argues that the courts should have little trouble concluding
that this law and its unusual enforcement mechanism amount to state action,
meaning this law is subject to normal constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme
Court’s decisions in Shelley v. Kraemer, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
and Terry v. Adams make clear that private parties can be considered state
actors, especially when they are working with the express approval of the
government and when the courts are required to hand down rulings that
seemingly infringe on well-settled constitutional protections. These decisions,
among others, show that the private-citizen plaintiffs deputized under this new
Texas law must be treated as state actors who are subject to constitutional
limitations.
* * * *
The Texas Legislature recently passed what the Supreme Court describes as
an “unprecedented” statutory scheme.1 This new law outlaws abortions
* Attorney. J.D., Arizona State University, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law; B.A.,
magna cum laude, Iowa State University. Alexander Lindvall is a municipal defense attorney in
Mesa, Arizona, whose practice focuses on § 1983 claims and constitutional litigation. The ideas
and opinions expressed in this article are the author’s only.
1. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, No. 21A24, 2021 WL 3910722, at *1 (U.S. Sep. 1,
2021) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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performed after a fetal heartbeat is detectable,2 which usually occurs around the
sixth week of pregnancy.3 Other states have passed, or at least proposed, similar
laws in the past,4 but what makes this Texas law “unprecedented” is its
enforcement mechanism.5
Typically, when a person violates a law, the government (through the police
and local prosecutors) is tasked with punishing the person and ensuring that the
law is properly enforced.6 The Texas law, on the other hand, strips the
government of its enforcement power and instead gives it to everyday citizens.7
If a private citizen in Texas believes someone performed an abortion after the
sixth week of pregnancy, that citizen can file a lawsuit against whoever
“perform[ed] or induce[d]” the abortion and whoever “aid[ed] or abet[ted] the
performance or inducement” of the abortion.8 If the citizen can then prove that
an abortion was performed after the woman’s sixth week of pregnancy, the court
is required to issue an order preventing the woman from receiving a future
abortion (which means the court will then have a part in monitoring her sexual
activity).9 The court is also required to award the private-citizen plaintiff at least
$10,000 for each illegal abortion they discovered.10 As Justice Sotomayor put it:
“In effect, the Texas Legislature has deputized the State’s citizens as bounty
hunters, offering them cash prizes for civilly prosecuting their neighbors’
medical procedures.”11
Under existing Supreme Court precedent—Roe v. Wade,12 Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,13 and many others14—
outlawing abortions performed after the sixth week of pregnancy is blatantly
unconstitutional.15 (The Court may decide to overrule those cases in the future,
but for the time being, Roe is still the law of the land.)
But this law presents a less-talked-about threshold question: Does the
Constitution prevent a private citizen from seeking to enforce an

2. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.201, 171.204.
3. Anna North & Catherine Kim, The “Heartbeat” Bills that Could Ban Almost All
Abortions,
Explained,
VOX,
https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2019/4/19/18412384/abortion-heartbeat-bill-georgia-louisiana-ohio-2019
[https://perma.cc/BXM7-973B] (June 28, 2019, 9:50 AM).
4. See, e.g., id.
5. Jackson, 2021 WL 3910722, at *1–2 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
6. See id.
7. Id. at *3 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
8. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.208(a)(1), (2).
9. Id. § 171.208(b)(1).
10. Id. § 171.208(b)(2). The law requires judges to award prevailing claimants “an amount of
not less than $10,000” for each illegal abortion discovered, plus their “costs and attorney’s fees.”
Id. § 171.208(b)(2), (3) (emphasis added). There is no limit to the amount the judge can award. See
id.
11. Jackson, 2021 WL 3910722, at *3 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
12. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
13. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1992).
14. E.g., June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2132–33 (2020); Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 83–84 (1976).
15. Casey, 505 U.S. at 845–46; Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–64.
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unconstitutional policy in the courts? The Constitution contains what is called a
“state action” requirement.16 The Constitution prevents the government from
interfering with individual rights; it does not prevent private parties from
interfering with your rights.17 As such, before a plaintiff can challenge a policy
or action on constitutional grounds, they must show that the government
somehow had a hand in causing their harm.18 (To use a simple example: If a
private person tells you to shut up, they haven’t violated your First Amendment
rights;19 but if the government tells you to shut up, it may be unconstitutionally
stifling your freedom of speech.20)
But the state action doctrine—like most legal doctrines—has exceptions and
workarounds. Perhaps the most famous example came in Shelley v. Kraemer.21
In Shelley, a group of private homeowners in St. Louis, Missouri, signed a
restrictive covenant that prevented “any person not of the Caucasian race” from
owning or occupying houses in the neighborhood.22 Years later, a black family
(the Shelleys) purchased a house in the neighborhood, and one of their neighbors
(the Kraemers) filed a lawsuit to enforce this racially discriminatory restrictive
covenant, asking the court to vacate the sale and kick the family out of the
neighborhood.23
The Missouri Supreme Court ultimately agreed to enforce the covenant,
finding that the covenant “violated no rights guaranteed . . . by the Federal
Constitution” because it was created by private parties.24 On appeal, however,
the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was “no doubt” that the
state action requirement was satisfied because the plaintiff was seeking to
enforce this covenant in a state court.25 The Shelley Court found that the
judiciary is just as much a part of the government as the legislature and
executive.26 When a judge enforces a racist, discriminatory contract, it places its
stamp of approval on the document—and this is something the Fourteenth
Amendment cannot allow, the Court found.27 Judges, in other words, are state
16. E.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002–03 (1982); Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922, 936 (1982).
17. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513, 521 (1976) (holding that a private shopping mall
cannot violate its patrons’ First Amendment rights); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163,
177 (1972) (holding that a private club does not violate the Constitution when it discriminates
against people because of their race); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (“[The Fourteenth
Amendment] erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or
wrongful.”).
18. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721–22 (1961).
19. See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 513, 520–21.
20. See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 26 (1971) (holding
that the government violated a citizen’s First Amendment rights by punishing him for wearing a
shirt that said “Fuck the Draft”).
21. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19–20.
22. Id. at 4–5.
23. Id. at 5–6.
24. Id. at 6 (citing Kraemer v. Shelley, 198 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Mo. 1946)).
25. Id. at 19.
26. Id. at 19–20.
27. Id. at 20.
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actors, and their judicial actions are limited by the Constitution.28
Similarly, in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,29 the Court held that a
private litigant in a court case can engage in state action if they “make extensive
use of state procedures with the overt, significant assistance of state officials.”30
Specifically, the Edmonson Court found that a private litigant and the courts
violate the Fourteenth Amendment when they use (and allow) racially
discriminatory peremptory challenges.31 The peremptory challenge system is a
product of the state: “peremptory challenges have no utility outside the jury
system, a system [that] the government alone administers.”32 As such, judges
(state actors) are constitutionally obligated to ensure that the court system isn’t
used to discriminate against people because of their race.33
And in Terry v. Adams,34 the Court held that the state cannot circumvent the
state action doctrine by delegating traditional government functions to private
parties.35 Texas has historically been creative when it comes to violating
people’s constitutional rights. In 1927, for example, the Court struck down a
Texas law preventing black voters from participating in primary elections.36 And
in 1944, the Court was forced to strike down a “reenacted” version of this same
Texas law.37 Realizing the Court was primed to strike down any overtly racist
voting laws, a Texas county tried a new trick: it delegated its control over polling
stations to a private, racially discriminatory organization.38
The theory was that a private organization could not engage in state action,
and therefore could discriminate against would-be black voters without running
afoul of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.39 The Terry Court was not
impressed or persuaded. The Court described the county’s attempted
workaround as “a flagrant abuse” of the electoral process and noted that the
government was “no more than [a] perfunctory ratifier[]” of unconstitutional
racial discrimination.40 The Court concluded: “It violates the Fifteenth
Amendment for a state, by such circumvention, to permit within its borders the
use of any device that produces an equivalent of [a racially discriminatory]
election.”41
Relating these decisions back to Texas’s new abortion law, it seems clear that
the state cannot circumvent the state action requirement simply by delegating its
enforcement powers to private litigants. For one, it would force the judiciary to
28. Id.
29. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
30. Id. at 622 (internal quotation omitted).
31. Id. at 624, 628.
32. Id. at 622.
33. Id. at 622–24, 628 (explaining the role of a trial judge and explaining how their actions
must conform to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment).
34. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
35. Id. at 469.
36. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927).
37. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 658, 664–66 (1944).
38. Terry, 345 U.S. at 462–63.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 469.
41. Id.
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issue decisions that inhibit a woman’s ability to seek a pre-viability abortion.42
This judicial intervention is state action under Shelley,43 and preventing previability abortions is clearly unconstitutional under existing precedent.44
Second, to enforce this new law, the private-citizen plaintiff would have to
“make extensive use of state procedures with the overt, significant assistance of
state officials.”45 Under Edmonson, this sort of tandem partnership between
private litigants and the courts is more than sufficient to trigger the state action
requirement.46 Finally, under Terry, the state action rule is satisfied because the
government has delegated a traditional governmental function (law
enforcement) to private parties.47 Texas’s “deputizing [of] private [citizens] to
carry out unconstitutional restrictions”48 is clever, but Texas has tried this
before.49 And the Court had little trouble finding that workarounds like this do
not insulate the government from constitutional scrutiny.50
The Supreme Court recently noted that Texas’s new anti-abortion law
presents “complex and novel antecedent procedural questions.”51 When it comes
to the state action question, I disagree.52 This question is not “novel.”53 The
government—and Texas in particular—has always tried to find new and creative
ways to violate constitutional rights.54 But, to date, the Court has been quick to
42. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, No. 21A24, 2021 WL 3910722, at *3 (U.S. Sep. 1,
2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
43. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1948).
44. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
45. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622 (1991) (internal quotation
omitted).
46. See id. at 624.
47. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953) (finding that a private party engages in
state action when it exercises a traditional governmental function with government approval).
48. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, No. 21A24, 2021 WL 3910722, at *5 (U.S. Sep. 1,
2021) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
49. Terry, 345 U.S. at 462–63.
50. Id. at 469.
51. Jackson, 2021 WL 3910722, at *1.
52. This article does not address the other antecedent procedural question that this law
presents: whether the Court’s sovereign immunity exception announced in Ex Parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908), applies to state court judges. See Jackson, 2021 WL 3910722, at *1 (taking note
of the Ex Parte Young issue). But I don’t believe this is a difficult issue either. The Supreme Court
tells state court judges what to do all the time. Whenever the Court issues a ruling, it is ordering all
lower courts to conform to that ruling—and when the Court strikes down a state law, it is ordering
that state’s judges to refrain from enforcing that law. And the same would be true if the Court were
to enjoin judges from enforcing an unconstitutional state law. There is no meaningful difference
between the Court striking down an unconstitutional state law and the Court enjoining judges from
enforcing an unconstitutional state law. It’s the exact same thing, just with a different name. There
is no principled reason to hold that Ex Parte Young does not apply to state-court judges.
53. See id.
54. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 457 (1973) (subsidizing racially segregated
private schools with taxpayer dollars); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606 (1971) (heavily
subsidizing parochial schools with taxpayer dollars in violation of the Establishment Clause);
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 297–98 (1966) (gifting a once-public park to a racially
discriminatory private entity); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 716 (1961)
(leasing space in a government building to a whites-only business); Terry, 345 U.S. at 462–63
(delegating the power to conduct elections to a private, racist organization); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 368–70 (1886) (issuing what seemed to be a neutral health and safety code but then
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say, “Nice try” and strike down these unconstitutional workarounds.55 And this
question is not “complex.”56 As shown above, the Court has consistently found
that private parties can be considered state actors, especially when they are
working with the express approval of the government and when the courts are
required to hand down rulings that seemingly infringe on well-settled
constitutional protections.57
These cases show that the private-citizen plaintiffs deputized under this new
Texas law must be treated as state actors. Their abortion-preventing causes of
action exist only because the state has sanctioned them, and the enforcement of
these causes of action requires judicial approval.58 These two facts make clear
that these lawsuits amount to state action. And because the statute blatantly
infringes a woman’s right to seek a pre-viability abortion, it violates the
Constitution under Roe and Casey.

applying the code only to Chinese immigrants to shut down their businesses).
55. See, e.g., Terry, 345 U.S. at 469.
56. Jackson, 2021 WL 3910722, at *1.
57. E.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622 (1991); Burton, 365 U.S. at
723–24; Terry, 345 U.S. at 469; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1948); Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501, 507–08 (1946) (finding that a privately owned company town was a state actor
because it exercised all the functions that are traditionally left to the government).
58. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.201–.212.

